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Over the past four decades, computational power and algorithmic strategies have advanced 
tremendously resulting in an enormous increase in the key sizes required for secure 
cryptosystems such as RSA. At the same time, the electronic devices have grown smaller and 
portable requiring algorithms running on them to be optimized in size and efficiency while 
providing security, at least, equivalent to that provided on a typical desktop computer. 
As a result, the industry is moving towards newer cryptosystems such as ECC and NTRU 
that are well suited for resource constrained environments. While, ECC claims to provide 
security equivalent to that of RSA for a fraction of key size, NTRU is inherently suited for 
embedded systems technology. 
However, implementation of new cryptosystems requires the development of protocols 
analogous to those developed using older cryptosystems. In this thesis, we fulfill a part of this 
requirement by providing protocols for Oblivious Transfer using ECC and NTRU. Oblivious 
Transfer, in turn, has applications in simultaneous contract signing, digital certified mail, 
simultaneous exchange of secrets, secure multiparty computations, private information retrieval, 
etc. 
Furthermore, we introduce the idea of basing Oblivious Transfer on public-key exchange 
protocols. The presentation in the thesis uses Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, but the scheme is 
generalizable to any cryptosystem that has a public-key exchange strategy. In fact, our proposal 
may especially be suited for Quantum Cryptography where the security of key exchange 




Cryptography is closely related to information theory. It is the art of making a piece of 
information unintelligible to certain people while letting some others make sense of it. 
Cryptography has been used for thousands of years, mainly in wars and conspiracies where the 
outcomes have been significantly affected by its proper use. The Second World War was a 
monstrous proof of this fact. However, today almost every person in a slightly technologically 
well to do society uses cryptography knowingly or unknowingly, the “simplest” examples being 
emails, credit cards and phone conversations. Banks rely heavily on their ability to securely 
communicate with their clients. Further, cryptography has applications in secure storage of 
information/data, secret-sharing, digital copy-rights management, exchanging secrets, 
simultaneous contract singing, online games and so on. 
If you are thinking, “I am not concerned with any of the above mentioned applications of 
cryptography, never used a credit card, never used Internet and do not even know the meaning of 
a computer; therefore, I do not need cryptography,” you cannot be further away from the truth. 
Every time when you leave your home, you certainly lock it, and only those who possess the 
correct key can enter. The key represents the secret information that is needed to open the lock. It 
may be in the form of a secret number (for a number lock) or ‘jagged’ combination of teeth on a 
conventional key. This is a form of cryptography. The only ways to open the lock (other than 
using the right key) are to prop it open (a brute force attack) or let a lock-smith try his skills (a 





The field of cryptography can be divided into two subfields: the symmetric key 
cryptography (secret-key cryptography) and the asymmetric key cryptography (public-key 
cryptography). While the symmetric key cryptography has existed for thousands of years, the 
asymmetric key cryptography is a product of the computer age that dawned upon us about four 
decades ago; the former still remains the most secure form of encryption. 
In a symmetric key encryption scheme, given an encryption/decryption key pair ( , it is 
computationally “easy” to determine  knowing only the value of e , and to determine  from 
. Therefore, both encryption and decryption keys need to be kept secret. Since  in most 
practical cases, the terms: single-key, one-key, conventional encryption and most importantly 






Even though symmetric key cryptography is extremely secure, it suffers from two 
fundamental problems: key-distribution and the extremely large number of keys required. The 
task of distribution has been traditionally accomplished by secure couriers. However, in the 
electronic age, with literally millions of users trying to establish secure sessions separated by 
thousands of miles, couriers become impossible. Moreover, the users need to change the shared 
session key from time to time. 
These practical difficulties brought upon the scientists the need to develop asymmetric key 
ciphers, often termed as Public-Key Ciphers (PKC). In the PKC, given an encryption key  it is 
computationally infeasible to determine the corresponding decryption key . Therefore, the 
encryption key can be made public while keeping the decryption key secret [22]. This eliminates 





significantly reduces the number of keys required in order to communicate between a given 
group of players. 
Public-Key Cryptography (also abbreviated PKC) seems very useful but it is much weaker 
in security (for a given key size) and order of magnitudes slower than symmetric-key 
cryptography. In other words, PKC requires much larger key sizes to achieve the same level of 
security as the secret-key cryptography. Therefore, public-key cryptographic schemes have come 
to be used for secret key transports and once the shared secret keys are delivered, secure sessions 
can be established using the conventional methods of encryption. Apart from key distribution, 
the other applications of PKC include Digital Signatures, Digital Certificates, Data Integrity 
Check, Oblivious Transfer, etc [30]. 
1.1.1 Public Key Cryptography 
The Public Key Cryptography had its inception in the 1970’s when Ralph Merkle [6] 
showed that it was possible to create problems of controllable difficulty using puzzles. Though 
Merkle’s idea laid the foundations of public-key cryptography, it was little appreciated until 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, published their paper, ‘New Directions in Cryptography’ 
[5] that finally catapulted the idea of public-key cryptography to new heights. 
The two major public-key schemes that emerged in the 1970s were the Diffie-Hellman 
scheme for key agreement in 1975 [5] and the key transport and digital signature scheme 
proposed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA [29]) in 1977. The security of the Diffie-
Hellman scheme is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem while the RSA 
scheme assumes that its security to be based upon the difficulty of integer factorization.  
In 1979, Michael O Rabin proposed a cryptosystem [27] based on the square transformation 
which was prohibited from use in the RSA scheme. The major advantage of Rabin’s 
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cryptosystem was that he could prove its security to be equivalent to integer factorization, which 
in the case of RSA is only an assumption. 
Even though Rabin’s cryptosystem has a formal proof of its security being equivalent to 
integer factorization, it has found little application because of the additional overhead needed to 
provide disambiguation of the decrypted message.  
An alternate sequence of development of public-key cryptography can be found in [7]. 
1.2 Oblivious Transfer 
In 1981, Rabin discovered an interesting application for his cryptosystem and he called this 
new scheme as ‘Oblivious Transfer’ [28]. An oblivious transfer scheme is a protocol in which a 
sender sends a message to a receiver with some fixed probability between 0 and 1 without the 
sender knowing whether or not the receiver received the message. 
Rabin presented the idea of OT applying it to solve the problem of mutual exchange of 
secrets; his protocol worked only for honest parties; Fischer, Micali and Rackoff presented a 
protocol [12] which used the concept of zero-knowledge proofs to make the “exchange of 
secrets” protocol secure against dishonest players. Blum [1] applied the notion to coin flipping, 
secret exchange and certified electronic mail.  
In 1983, Even, Goldreich and Lempel [9] introduced the idea of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer 
where the sender (Alice) sends two secrets  and  and the receiver’s (Bob’s) input is choice 
bit ; the latter then learns  but gets no information about the other secret . In turn, Alice 
does not know which of the two secrets Bob has retrieved. 
0S 1S
b bS bS −1
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Kilian [20] proved that the notion of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer was enough to develop all 
secure two party schemes for oblivious circuit evaluation. The idea of Private Information 
Retrieval was introduced in [3, 4, 21]. 
1.3 The Need for New Public Key Cryptosystems 
Although the above developments were all based on ‘exponential modular arithmetic’, other 
cryptosystems were being developed in parallel. Most prominent were the McEliece 
cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory and the ElGamal public-key encryption and 
signature scheme in 1984. The ElGamal scheme was seen as a rival to the RSA scheme and was 
based on the discrete logarithm problem rather than integer factorization [6].  
The Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was discovered by Victor Miller and Neal Koblitz in 
1985 again based on the discrete logarithm problems. In 1996, J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher and J.H. 
Silverman, presented the NTRU (Number Theorists aRe Us) cryptosystem which is based on the 
ring of truncated polynomials [24]. NTRU has come to be known for its efficiency in creating 
public/private key pairs which makes it feasible to change keys often as well as its encryption 
and decryption speed.  
Two reasons for the upcoming of new cryptosystems are: first, due to the advancement in 
factorization techniques and increase in computational power, RSA requires at least a 1024 bit 
key for secure encryption. Second, the electronics industry has seen devices grow smaller. 
Handheld PDAs, cell-phones with built in internet capabilities, sensor networks that gather 
crucial military data, embedded systems, etc. have very limited battery life and limited 
processing power. The algorithms used on them need to be optimized not only in size (due to 
limited memory) but also in speed (efficiency). Further, Internet access on PDAs and cell-phones 
means that large number of people use these media for bank transactions, emails access, private 
5 
 
chats, etc. Therefore, security provided in them has to be at power if not greater than that which 
is available on a desktop computer. 
According to the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) the keys in the 
public key cryptosystems must match in strength with the symmetric cryptosystems such as 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [6]. This is because AES uses public-key cryptosystems 
to provide digital signatures for non-repudiation and key agreement techniques that greatly 
simplifies key management. A 128-bit AES key requires a 3072-bit RSA key and a 256-bit key 
requires an RSA of 15,360 bits. On the other hand, cryptosystems such as ECC scale linearly 
with AES and maintain comparable key sizes. Therefore, a 512-bit key size for ECC suffices for 
a 256-bit AES algorithm [6]. ECC is showing up in standardization efforts, including the IEEE 
P1363 Standard for public-key cryptography [32]. 
A comparison of the key size requirements is given in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1. NIST guidelines for key sizes to maintain equivalent strengths across 







       Minimum Size of Public Keys (bits) 
    DSA/DH                RSA                  ECC 
80 - 1024 1024 160 
112 3DES 2048 2048 224 
128 AES-128 3072 3072 256 
192 AES-192 7680 7680 384 
256 AES-256 15360 15360 512 
 
If ECC claims smaller key sizes, NTRU provides faster encryption even with key sizes 
comparable to that of RSA. Specifically, NTRU claims that for a key consisting of  bits, RSA 
and ECC systems require on the order of  operations to encrypt or decrypt a message, while 
NTRU requires only on the order of  operations [24]. As a result NTRU is making an impact 






1.3.1 Problem Formulation and Layout of the Thesis 
From the previous sections, we can conclude that there is a need for implementation of new 
cryptosystems that are suitable for low power devices with limited computational power. Also, 
we have seen that oblivious transfer is an important idea and is a basis for a number of “high 
level” protocols. Therefore, the development of protocols using cryptosystems such as ECC and 
NTRU, that are analogous to those that have been developed using exponential arithmetic, is 
needed. This will provide a smooth transition from present technology to the new ones.  
In Chapter 2, we describe the “traditional” oblivious transfer scheme but present its 
implementation using a new class of transformation introduced in [16]. Chapter 3 provides 
protocols for oblivious transfer using Elliptic Curve Cryptography. We will follow setup similar 
to that described in [28] and provide solution for mutual exchange of secrets and 1-out-of-2 
oblivious transfer. In Chapter 4 the solution to the above two problems is presented using the 
NTRU cryptosystem. In chapter 5, we develop an oblivious transfer protocol based on the idea of 
public-key exchange. Even though we explicitly provide a scheme that is based on Diffie-
Hellman transformation, the idea is to introduce new implementation strategy for OT based on 
key exchange, different from those used before. This has the advantage of generalizing the 
scheme to all the new cryptosystems, since all of them have an implicit key exchange strategy in 




Implementing Oblivious Transfer 
 
 
Public-Key Cryptography involves the use of trapdoor functions. Some of these are one-to-
one functions, while the others are many-to-one functions. The idea of OT was first developed 
using the latter type of function. Rabin described OT using the square transformation of the form 
,  nmc mod2= qpn ×= , p  and  are primes, which results in two or four messages being 
mapped to a single cipher. Hence, Alice would convey the factors of  (assuming Alice is 
using a public key encryption method of the form , where  is the encryption 
exponent) without knowing for sure whether Bob received the factors or not. In other words, Bob 
may or may not receive the factors, each happening with probability one-half.  Now when Alice 
sends her secret to Bob encrypting it using her public-key encryption function, Bob will be able 





Another interesting class of many-to-one functions was introduced by Kak [16]. He 
discussed the application of the transformation of the type ; where, n  is a product 
of two primes 
nmc mod3=
p  and  such that the Euler’s Totient function q ( )nφ  is divisible only by 3 and not 
9. This case was overlooked in [27], where the author had implicitly assumed that ( )nφ  is 
divisible by 9. 
The restriction on ( )nφ  [16] implies that only one of the factors of , say n p , is of the form 
, while the 13 +k ( ) 13), =qGCD (φ ; (GCD stands for Greatest Common Divisor). Such an 
arrangement causes only three clear-text messages to map to a single cipher; one message less 
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than the square transformation. Also, Kak’s cubic transformation gives rise to a two-third 
probability of transfer when used to implement oblivious transfer.  
In the following sections, we first briefly review Kak’s scheme and then discuss its 
application to oblivious transfer.  
2.1 The Cubic Transformation 
Consider the transformation , where pmc mod3= 13 += kp  and . The 
condition  simplifies calculations; in general, one may use other values of 
4mod3=p
4mod3=p p . If 
 is not divisible by 9, the inverse 1−p 3
1















cc                                                                                                     (2.1) 
The reason for this is the fact that  by Fermat’s Little Theorem and . 
Hence, 









. If 69mod1 =−p , then 2+p  is divisible by 9; if 39mod1 =−p , then 
 is divisible by 9. Consequently, the result in equation 2.1. 3)1(2 +−p
It turns out that the cube roots of 1 are 1, α  and . Therefore, the cube roots of an 
arbitrary  are , 
2α
c m αm  and . Hence, it suffices to fix a single value for 2αm α , between Alice 
and Bob. 
The three cube roots of 1 may be obtained by solving the equation: . Apart from 
1, the other two roots can be obtained by solving , which is easily possible if the 
square root of 
013 =−α
012 =++αα
3−p  exits. By Euler’s criterion,  is a square modulo b p  if and only if 
pb p mod12)1( ≡− . Since , the square root 4mod3=p 4121 += paa , we can write 
if   69mod1 =−p

















                                                                             (2.2) 
Now, consider the transformation , where nmc mod3= 13 += kp
c
  and  is relatively 



















                                                                                         (2.3) 
Since, we deal with computations modulo qpn ⋅= , we can solve the equation  
modulo the two primes factors of  separately and then combining the results to generate an 




Example 2.1: Set  and 7=p 11=q . Our first task is to find the solution to the cube root of 
1. We can do so by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and solving:  
separately, modulo 7 and 11. 
013 =−α
For , we note that  is square modulo 7, and therefore, 7=p 43 =−p 4,2=pα  by equation 
(2.2). However, we note that  is not a square modulo 11, therefore equation (2.2) cannot 
be used. Hence, we use 
83 =−q
1=qα  only; the other values can be found using probabilistic algorithms 
however, they are not needed. Combining the result using CRT:  
( ) ( )( ) nqpppqq qp modmodmod 11 −− ××+××= ααα                                          (2.4) 
We obtain the two values 231 =α  and 672 =α . Alice and Bob may, beforehand, agree to 
use 23=α . (Note that ). 77mod212 αα =
if  69mod)( =nφ  
if  39mod)(  nφ =
10 
 
Returning to our example, if 12=m , then other values that will map to the same cipher are 
34=αm  and . Bob may send the cipher along with side information that helps Alice 
decide on which of the possible cube roots is the message.  
452 =αm
2.2 Oblivious Transfer 




AAA qpn ⋅= 13 += kpA 1)3,1( =−Aq  and 4mod3=p , to encrypt her secret and that 
she wants to send this encrypted secret to Bob, obliviously. For Bob to decrypt the secret he must 
have the decryption key, which in this case is equivalent to having the factors of . However, 
in an oblivious scheme the recipient should obtain the secret only with a fixed probability 
between 0 and 1. Thus, the problem of oblivious transfer of secret reduces to the problem of 
oblivious transfer of the decryption key.  
An
The encryption exponent 3 and  are public. The transfer proceeds as follows: An
1. Bob randomly chooses an Anx <  and sends to Alice A . B nxc mod
3=
2. Alice computes AB ncx mod31 =  (since she knows the factors of An ) and sends it to 
Bob. 
3. Bob evaluates )),(( 1 AnxxGCDy −= . 
After step 3, py =  or q  with a two-third probability. Consequently, Bob can compute the 
decryption key with a probability of two-third.  
To see the working of the algorithm consider the example below: 
Example 2.2: Let  and 13=Ap 3=Aq , 39313 =⋅=⋅= AAA qpn . Let Bob’s choice be 
. And he sends  to Alice. Alice then computes the cube root of 5 11=x 539 =mod113=Bc
11 
 
modulo 39. Note that . Hence, Alice may send either 11, 8 or 20; each 
with equal probability, since She does not know what was Bob’s choice. 
39mod520811 333 ≡≡≡
If Alice sends 11, Bob computes 0)39),1111(( =−= GCDy
11((
. He does not receive the 
factors. 
If Alice sends 8, Bob computes 3)39,3()39),8 ==−= GCDGCDy
((
. He receives . Aq
If Alice sends 20, Bob computes 3)39,9()39),1120 ==−= GCDGCDy
)( An
. He receives . Aq
Therefore, we see that Bob receives the factors with a probability two-third. He can 
consequently compute φ  and the decryption key. Alice is completely unaware as to whether 
Bob received the factors or not. Her knowledge is limited to the apriori probability of two-third. 
Hence, we have achieved our goal of oblivious transfer. 
2.2.1 Comments 
Rabin’s protocol was built on the square transformation giving rise to an oblivious transfer 
probability of one-half. Thus the protocol for mutual exchange of secrets, implemented by Rabin, 
has a non-termination probability of one-quarter for every iteration. However, using Kak’s cubic 
function a mutual exchange of secrets protocol would have a non-termination probability of only 
one-ninth. 
Moreover, probabilities of transfer other than one-half may be useful in certain applications 
such as lottery draws, where the probability of draw of prizes of larger value must be lower than 
the probability of draw for the prizes of lower value. 
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Chapter 3  
Oblivious Transfer Using Elliptic Curves* 
As seen in the Chapter 1, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has started to show up as a 
serious competitor to RSA due to the tremendous increase in key length required for a secure 
RSA putting a heavier processing load on applications implementing it. ECC offers equal 
security compared to RSA for much smaller key sizes, thereby reducing processing overhead.  
Rabin [28] presented the notion of oblivious transfer while developing a solution to the 
problem of mutual exchange of secrets between two distrustful parties. We develop a similar 
protocol for oblivious transfer using ECC and apply it to provide a solution for mutual exchange 
of secrets and also implement the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. 
3.1 Background 
ECC is a public-key cipher that is based on the use of an abelian group. Another example of a 
well known cipher based on the abelian group is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange where the 
encryption keys are generated by exponentiation over the group. For elliptic curve cryptography, 
addition over the group is used and multiplication is replaced by repeated addition. For example, 
, where the addition is performed over an elliptic curve [8, 32]. ( vvvkv +++=× K )
In general, an elliptic curve is defined by an equation containing two variables, with 
coefficients belonging to the set of real numbers. However, for cryptographic purposes the 
variables and coefficients are restricted to elements in a finite field:  
pbaxxpy mod)(mod 32 ++=        (3.1) 
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*Journal version: Cryptologia, Volume 31, Issue 2 April 2007, pages 125 – 132. 
where  and  are integer constants and  is a prime . The set of points  is a set  
of all 
a b p ),( baE p ),( yx
x  and  satisfying (3.1). y
The order r  of a point  on an elliptic curve is defined as the smallest positive 
integer 
),( 11 yxT =
r  such that ; the evaluation of 0=rT rT  is a computation done on elliptic curve [8].  A 
point  is called a base point in  and is picked such that its order G )b,(aE p r  is a very large 
value. 
A finite abelian group can be defined based on the set  provided that 
 has no repeated factors, which is equivalent to the condition 
. The rules for arithmetic stated below hold good for both the 
elliptic curves defined over real numbers as well as the finite field [32]. For any points 
: 
),( baE p
pbaxx mod)( 3 ++
pba mod)274( 23 +
),(, baEQP p∈
pmod0≠
1. O  serves as the additive identity. Thus POP =+  and OO −= . 
In the following we assume that OP ≠  and OQ ≠ ,  
2. If ),( PP yx  then the point ),P = ( PP yx −  is the negative of P , denoted as P− . 
3. Multiplication is defined as repeated addition; i.e. PPPPP +++=4 . 
4. If ),( PP yx , ),( QQ yx  and QPP = Q = −≠ , then ),( RR yxQPR =+=  is determined 
by the following rules: 
pxxx QPR mod)(
2 −−= λ  


















































Thus the addition operation on elliptic curves is analogous to modular multiplication in RSA 
and the repeated addition is the analogous to modular exponentiation. The security of ECC arises 
from the fact that for , where kPQ = ),(, baEPQ p∈  and pk < , it is easy to calculate Q  given 
the values of  and , but it is relatively very hard to determine  given the values of  and k P k Q
P ;  this is the discrete logarithm problem over the elliptic curves [32]. 
A standard elliptic curve transfer proceeds as follows. Encode the plain text message m  to 
be sent as an ( - point  . It is the point  that will be encrypted as cipher-text and 
subsequently decrypted. We cannot simply encode the message as the 
)yx , mP mP
x  or  coordinate at a 
point, because not all such coordinates are in . User Alice selects a private key n  and 
generates a public key U . Similarly, Bob generates a public key U . To encrypt and 
send a message  to Bob, Alice chooses a random positive integer and produces a cipher-text 




GA = nA ×
mP k
mC
};{ Bmm kUPkGC +=  
Alice has used Bob’s public key . To decrypt the cipher-text, Bob multiplies the first 
point in the pair with his own secret key and subtracts the result from the second point: 
BU
( ) ( ) ( ) mBBmBBm PkGnGnkPkGnkUP =−+=−+  
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Note that Alice has masked the message  by adding   to it. Nobody but Alice knows 
the value of , so even though  is public, nobody can remove the mask . Reader may 
refer to [8] for further background on elliptic curve cryptography. 
mP BkU
k BU BkU
With the above background on Elliptic Curve Cryptography, we set forth on the task of 
developing the protocol for oblivious transfer. 
3.2 Key Observation 
If we compare the square transformation in [28] and the elliptic curve equation given by 
(3.1), we can rewrite (3.1) as  
Xpy =mod2          (3.2) 
where . It should be clear to the reader that for every pbaxxX mod)( 3 ++= x  coordinate there 
are two possible  coordinates. However, unlike in the square transformation, here neither y x  
nor  can be substituted for a message, because not all values of y x  and  are permissible in 
ECC.  
y
3.3 The Proposed Algorithm 
Our aim is to allow exchange of secret  and  between two parties Alice and Bob 
without using a trusted third party and without simultaneous exchange. Here, we do not go into 
the details of signing the messages using ECC and take it for granted that all the messages are 
signed.  
AS BS
Both Alice and Bob select a common elliptic curve . This information is public. 
They then decide upon one 
),( baEq
x -coordinate. Let the two points corresponding to this x -coordinate 
be  and , whereupon by symmetry 1P 2P 21 PP −= . The x - coordinate is also public knowledge. 
16 
 
Since, Alice and Bob have not decided upon which - coordinate to use, we will denote Alice’s 





2P1PA  or PA =  
Similarly,   or 1PB P= 2PPB = .  
Even though the x - coordinate is common, neither party knows what is the final point 
chosen by the other because there are two possible - coordinates to choose from. y
P
Now, let Alice choose a secret key , which she wishes to use for encryption of her 
messages, with the aim of obliviously conveying this secret key  to Bob. Also, we assume that 
a procedure for mapping of    to a point on elliptic curve has been pre-decided. We call the 
point on our elliptic curve, corresponding to , as . Thus, if a person knows , he can 






With the above assumptions, the oblivious transfer of the secret key proceeds as follows: 
1. Alice sends to Bob :  AAP  n
  
( ) RPn AA2. Bob sends to Alice :  { BB Pn  ;  nB + ;  RnB  } 
 
where,  is Bob’s secret key Bn
 R   is randomly chosen point by Bob, belonging to the group . ),( baEq
 
3. Alice computes : An  [ ( ) ( )BPBA nAAB nPnn R −+  ]  = Q  
 
4. Alice sends to Bob : { P(nn BBA ) Q+  ;  ( )B R AnA Pnn +  } 
 
5. Bob computes :  
a. )AAB   = ( ) (BA PnnQPn −+Bn K  
 
b.   = B  ( ) KnPRn BnA A −+ ZnB
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The sequence of steps presented above achieves our goal of oblivious transfer. The two 
cases that arise in such a transfer are BA PP =  and BA PP ≠ . We discuss these two cases below 
and show how the algorithm given above achieves our goal. 
The difference between the two cases arises in step 3. Hence, we analyze them step 3 
onwards. 
Case I:     BA PP =
3. Alice computes : An  [ ( ) ( )BBAAAB PnnRPnn −+  ]  = Rn  A
 
4. Alice send to Bob : { ( ) RnPnn ABBA +  ; ( ) AnBA PRnn +  } 
 
5. Bob computes : 
a.  = Rn  ( ) ( )AABABBA PnnRnPnn −+ A
 
b. )Rnn   = 
An
P  ( ) (PRnn ABnBA A −+
Case II:     BA PP ≠
In this case, we note that . Therefore, the results are as follows: BA PP −=
3. Alice computes : An  [ ( ) ( )BBAAAB PnnRPnn −+  ]  = An  [ ( ) RPnn AAB +×2 ]  
4. Alice send to Bob : { ( ) ( ) ]2[ RPnnnPnn AABABBA +×+ ;  ( ) AnBA PRnn +  } 
5. Bob computes : 
a. ( ) ( ) ( )AABAABABBA PnnRPnnnPnn −+×+ ]2[   =  K  
b. )Kn   ≠  
An
P  ( ) (PRnn BnBA A −+
Note: K is never equal to  unless RnA BA PP =  or )0,0(== BA PP . Hence, the users are not 
allowed to choose and)0,0(=AP )0,0(=BP  in our algorithm. 
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Once the receiver knows , he can deduce  from it. Therefore, this point forward we 





However, it is to be noted that no matter what calculations are performed by Bob in step 5, 
he cannot get  if . The problem is equivalent to the discrete log problem in case of 
.  
An BA PP ≠
BA PP ≠
Since,  with probability one-half, Bob receives the secret key  with probability 
one-half. 
BA PP = An
Returning to our algorithm, Bob can verify the value  he has obtained from step 5, 
whether it is  or not, by doing 
BZ
An 1PZB ×  and 2PZ B ×  and checking if one of them is equal to 
 sent to him by Alice in the first step. AAPn
In a similar manner, Bob transfers his secret key  to Alice with probability one-half. Once 
this transfer has been achieved we can follow steps similar to those proposed in [28] in order to 
prevent cheating by either of the parties during exchange of information. Here, we present these 
steps, adapting them to suit elliptic curve transfers. We define the state of knowledge of the 










AW     
if Alice does not know Bob’s secret key










BW      
if Bob knows Alice’s secret key
if Bob does not know Alice’s secret key
where Μ  is a constant and Μ  is the bit wise complement of Μ . 
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After the transfer of keys according the algorithm presented in this chapter and having 
defined the state of knowledge of keys as above, 
Alice sends to Bob:  AA SW ⊕
Bob sends to Alice:  BB SW ⊕
Note: Reader may be reminded from the start of Section 3.3 that  is Alice’s secret which 
Bob wishes to know and  is Bob’s secret which Alice wishes to know. 
AS
BS
Note that the above two steps do not provide either party any information about the other’s 
secret. Now, Alice may transfer her secret to Bob using an elliptic curve cryptographic transfer. 
However, in our scheme, Alice will encode her secret using her secret key and not the public key 
of Bob. (From section 3.1) We take G to be the base point with large order. 
Alice sends to Bob      :  GnS AA +  
Bob computes (assuming he knows  ) :  An GnGnS AAA −+  =  AS
Bob transfers his secret to Alice in the next step in a similar manner. However, suppose, at 
the last step Bob were to cheat and not pass on his secret  to Alice, then the fact that Bob has 
cheated Alice implies that Bob has , i.e. 
BS
An BB SW ⊕  = BS⊕Μ . Here ⊕  denotes Exclusive-OR 
operation. 
Thus, Alice can do BB SS =Μ⊕⊕Μ  and thus obtain . The probability, when the 
protocol is completed, that neither one knows the other’s secret is one-quarter. 
BS
Example 3.1: Let Alice and Bob choose an elliptic curve . The equation 
corresponding to this curve is . Now, both parties, Alice and 
Bob, decide upon a common 
)21,9(23E
23mod)219(23mod 32 ++= xxy
x -coordinate, say 7. The two points corresponding to this x -
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coordinate are  and )6,7(1 =P )17,7(2 =P
5
. From the properties of elliptic curves, we have 
.   21 PP −=




. We do not explore the details of mapping of to 
a point on the elliptic curve and just refer to it as . In turn, let Bob choose a secret number 
 and a random point . Now we execute our algorithm by considering the two 





Case 1:  and  )6,7(=AP BP



















2. Bob sends to Alice:   
})19,14();5,11();
})1,2(3);1,2()18,11(3);6;; +nRPn BB )( +Pnn AAB































5. Bob computes: 
a) KPnQ =−+)( )  (
15(      )18,11(3)9, −=  
      )9,13()9,15(= −  












Case 2:  and  )6,7(=AP )17,7(=BP
1. Alice sends to Bob: )18,11()6,7(5 ==AAPn . 




+=+ RnRPnnPn BAABBB  






















5. Bob computes: 
a) KPnnQPnn AABBBA =−+ )()(  
)18,11(3)2,17( −=  
      )9,13()2,17( −=   




  )4,14()13,1( −+=
An
P    
  AnP≠  
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3.4 Chosen One-out-of-two Oblivious Transfer 
The chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfer [9], - OT for short, is an important 
application of the basic oblivious transfer protocol. In this transfer, the sender sends two secrets 
 and  and the receiver’s input is choice bit c ; the latter then learns  but gets no 











This transfer has been implemented using exponentiations. Here we show that the one-out-
of-two oblivious transfer can be implemented using the algorithm we presented. 
We assume that both parties are willing to take part in the protocol honestly, i.e. Alice is 
willing to disclose one out of two secrets that she has to Bob, but Bob does not want Alice to 
know which one secret he wants to know. Also, Bob should learn only the one secret he wants to 
know and nothing about the other. 
In other words, Alice is said to have two secrets  and . Alice associates different secret 
keys to each secret. These secret keys will be used to encrypt  and  when transferring them 
to Bob. Bob must be able to retrieve only one of these two secrets and Alice should not come to 
know what Bob has extracted. 
0S 1S
0S 1S
Let Alice associate keys  with  and   with  for encryption. Bob’s task is to 
retrieve one of these two keys; i.e., retrieve  if he wants to know . The retrieval should be 
accomplished in such a manner that Alice should not be able to determine which key Bob has 
retrieved and Bob should not gain any information about the key he could not retrieve. 
0A





Recall, from the previous section that every x - coordinate yields two points   and  such 
that . Alice declares that she is associating secret  with point  and secret  with 





1. Alice sends to Bob : { 10 PnA   ;   21 PnA  } 
2. Bob sends to Alice : { BB Pn  ;   ( ) RPnn AB +10  ;   ( ) RPnn AB +21  ;   RnB  } 
3. Alice computes :  
0A
n [ ( ) ( )BBAAB PnnRPnn 00 1 −+  ] =  ;    1H
1A
n  [ ( ) ( )BBAAB PnnRPnn 11 2 −+  ] = . 2H
4. Alice sends to Bob :  
{  ; ( ) 10 HPnn BBA + ( ) 00 AnBA PRnn +  ;      ( ) 21 HPnn BBA +  ; ( ) 11 AnBA PRnn +  } 
Note: 
0An
P  and 
1An
P  is the mapping of secret keys 
0A
n  and 
1A
n  to points on the elliptic curve. 
Bob must have chosen   in the second step such that BP 1PPB =  if Bob wants secret  and 
 if Bob wants secret . Therefore after step 4, Bob picks up only one of the two pairs of 
points sent to him by Alice which will yield the secret key he wants.  
0S
2PPB = 1S
For example, if Bob has chosen 1PPB =   then the first pair of points in step 4, i.e.                 
{  ; ( ) 10 HPnn BBA + ( ) 00 AnBA PRnn +  }, will yield  in the following manner : 0An
5. Bob computes : 
a) ( ) ( ) RnHPnnHPnn AABBBA 000 111 ==−+   





P , Bob can easily calculate 
0A
n .   The second pair of points will not yield any key. 
Thus, Bob can get only one of the two secret keys and Alice remains oblivious to the fact that 
which of the two keys did Bob retrieve.  
Alice may send both the secrets to Bob in the following manner:  
Alice sends to Bob: { ; GnP As 00 + GnP As 11 +  }, where  is the mapping of secret  to the 





Bob will be able to retrieve only  in our example because he has only  and hence 
obtain . He will not be able to get any information from the second half of the message about 
secret . Alice does not know which of the two secrets Bob obtained. We have achieved our 








This chapter has described the idea of oblivious transfer using elliptic curves and presented 
an algorithm for its implementation. Also we describe the application of our protocol to the 









The algorithm presented here may be expressed in different variants. The key contribution is 
the introduction of oblivious transfer to ECC. The one-out-of-two oblivious transfer may be 
further modified in order to obtain 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer.  
In the next chapter, we will develop a protocol for mutual exchange of secrets using NTRU 
cryptosystem. As mentioned before, though NTRU does not provide any decrease in key sizes, it 




Exchanging Secrets Using NTRU 
In this chapter we will discuss the NTRU cryptosystem and develop the idea of oblivious 
transfer using NTRU. The application of the idea to the problem of mutual exchange of secrets is 
presented in section 4.2. While the section 4.3 presents a protocol for 1-out-of-2 oblivious 
transfer. 
4.1 Background 












N xaxaxaxaaa K  
Any two polynomials  and  are added together in the usual manner of polynomial 
addition by summing up the coefficients of similar powers of 
a b
x . Example, 
( ) ( ( )) ( ) 111221100 −−− +++++++=+ NNN xbaxaxbababa K2b+ . Similarly, the multiplication 
laws hold true for the polynomials provided the powers of x  are suitably mapped to 1−N  by 
replacing  by 1,  by Nx 1+Nx x  and so no.  The set of all such polynomials is denoted by R  [24]. 
The above addition and multiplication rules make R  into a ring, which is called the Ring of 







The NTRU public-key cryptosystem uses the ring of truncated polynomials along with 
modular arithmetic. This has further the effect of reducing the coefficients of the polynomial 
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modulo a number . Note here that  may not be a prime. Thus the expression  (modulo ) 
represents the reduction of coefficients of the polynomial  modulo . 
q q a q
a q
The inverse modulo  of a polynomial  is a polynomial q a qA  with the property that: 
qAa q mod1≡∗  
Even though not all polynomials have an inverse modulo q , it is easy to determine if a 
polynomial has an inverse and to compute if it exists. The details of a fast algorithm for 
computing the inverse is described in [15]. 
4.1.1 The NTRU Cryptosystem 
The NTRU cryptosystem is characterized by the following parameters [24]: 
 
1. N  - the polynomials used are of degree 1−N . 
2. q  - is a large modulus. (Not necessarily prime.) 
3. p - is a small modulus. (Not necessarily prime.) 
Table 4.1. Typical values for the above parameters ,  and N q p  [24]. 
 
Security N  q p
Moderate 167 128 3 
Standard 251 128 3 
High 347 128 3 
Highest 503 256 3 
 
a) Key Generation: Alice generates an encryption/decryption key pair (or a public/private 
key pair). In order to do so she chooses two polynomials f  and g  belonging to the ring R . The 
polynomial f  should have inverses modulo two numbers q  and p . In general, q  is large and 
p  is small and that q  and p  do not have any common factors. 
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The inverses of polynomial  modulo q  and modulo f p  is denoted by  and , i.e. 
 and . 
qF pF
qfFq mod1≡∗ pfFp 1≡∗ mod
Alice now computes her public key ( )qgpFh q mod∗≡ . Her private key is the polynomial 
. f
The polynomials  and f g  are chosen to be “small” relative to a random polynomial 
modulo . In a random polynomial the coefficients are randomly distributed mod  where as in 
a “small” polynomial, the coefficients are much smaller than . 
q q
q
b) Encryption: When Bob wants to send a message to Alice, he first encodes his message as 
a polynomial m  of degree 1−N  with coefficients lying between 2/p−  to 2/p . He also 
chooses a small random polynomial r . The encrypted message sent to Alice is of the form:   
( )qmhrc mod+∗=  
c) Decryption: Alice decrypts c  to obtain the original message polynomial m  (or 
equivalently the message) as follows: Alice computes: ( )qcfa mod∗= , where the coefficients 
of the resultant polynomial a  is chosen to lie between 2/q−  and 2/q . 
Finally, Alice computes: ( )paFm p mod∗=′ . 
The resultant  in the last step is the same as m  with an extremely large probability for 
appropriately chosen parameter values. In some cases, the decryption may fail to yield the 
correct message and therefore check bits need to be included. For the detailed description of the 
method for choosing appropriate parameters refer to [15]. 
m′
The encryption/decryption scheme work because of the following: 
( ) ( ) ( )














and ( ) ( ) pmpmfgprFpaFm pp modmodmod =∗+∗∗=∗=′ . 
With this background we discuss, in the next section, the implementation of OT using 
NTRU. 
4.2 The Proposed Technique 
Suppose Alice and Bob wish to exchange secret AS  an BS , however they do not trust 
each other.  The problem is to develop a protocol without trusted third party and without a 
simultaneous exchange. Here we propose a protocol to do so using the NTRU encryption. We 
have outlined the advantages of using NTRU in Chapter 1. We take for granted that every 
message exchanged between Alice and Bob is signed. 
s d  
In order to conduct the exchange, Alice generates a two secret encryption keys ,  and 
their corresponding decryption keys , . She is going to use one of these encryption keys to 
encrypt her original secret  when transferring it to Bob. However, for Bob to decrypt the 
cipher to obtain the secret, he needs to know the correct decryption key, which will be 
transferred to him “obliviously” with a probability of one-half. Bob generates two secret 
encryption/decryption key pairs /  and / . These will be used for the transfer of  
from Bob to Alice. For all the computations Alice and Bob agree upon the parameters to be used 


















N p  and , where they have their usual meaning. The method of key 
generation, encryption and decryption remains the same as described in section 4.1. 
q
Now, Alice generates another pair of encryption/decryption key Ah Af hich she will use to 





Therefore, all the keys generated by either party are kept secret. Only one of the main 
decryption keys ( , ) will be transferred obliviously (vice versa for ,  in the second 
half of the protocol) . The protocol proceeds as follows (appropriate modulus operations are 









1. Alice generates a random polynomial Ar  and using the encryption key Ah , she encrypts 




f  and sends them to Bob. 
Alice sends to Bob: 
11 AAA
fhrc +∗=    and   
22 AAA
fhrc +∗= . 
2. Bob randomly chooses one of the ciphers, 1c  and 2c  and encrypts it using his own secret 
key Bh  and a randomly chosen polynomial Br . 
Bob sends to Alice: 
1AAABB
fhrhrc +∗+∗=   or   
2AAABB
fhrhrc +∗+∗= . 
3. Alice decrypts the cipher sent by Bob by subtracting AA fr ∗  from c  and sends it back to 
Bob. 
Alice sends to Bob: 
1ABB
fhrc +∗=′   or  
2ABB
fhrc +∗=′  depending on what she 
receives. 
4. Bob can now subtract BB hr ∗  from c′  and obtains one of the keys 1Af  or 2Af . Alice 
remains oblivious to which of the two keys Bob has received. 
Steps 1 through 4 achieve oblivious transfer of encryption keys; the following steps are for the 
exchange of secrets. 
5. Bob sends to Alice BSM ⊕1  if he has received 1Af  else he sends BSM ⊕2 . 
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Here,  and  are pre-agreed random constants. Alice at this point does know which of the 
two keys Bob has received and hence she does not know if Bob has sent  or 
1M 2M
BSM ⊕1 BSM ⊕2  to 
her. 
6. Alice randomly chooses one of the two encryption keys 
1A
h  or 
2A
h  and another random 
polynomial r . 
Alice sends to Bob: AAS Shrc A +∗= 1    or   AAS Shrc A +∗= 2 . 
where we have assumed that secret  is represented in the polynomial form with 
coefficients of the polynomial chosen to lie between 
AS
2/p−  and . 2/p
Bob will receive the secret  if he can successfully decrypt , which will depend on his 
chances of having the decryption key for the encryption function that Alice has randomly 
chosen. Since, there are two possible encryption functions Alice can choose from, Bob’s 
probability of receiving the secret after step 6 is one-half. Alice will remain oblivious to whether 
Bob has received the secret. 
AS ASc
Similar transfer of secret keys and exchange of secret takes place from Bob to Alice. 
Step 6 is a purely NTRU PKCS transfer involving encryption and decryption in the NTRU 
system. 
If after receiving , Bob was to cheat and not send his secret to Alice then Alice will know 
which of the two XORs (  or 
AS
BSM ⊕1 BSM ⊕2 ) had Bob sent in step 5 and therefore deduce . BS
4.3 One-out-of-two Oblivious Transfer 
A situation in which Alice has two secrets  and  such that Bob wants one of these 




other hand, Alice is concerned that Bob must get only the secret he chooses and no information 
about the other secret. We had presented a protocol for the solution of this problem in chapter 3. 
Here we solve the problem using NTRU encryption functions. 
It is not difficult to see the solution since we have discussed the protocol for exchange of 
secrets in the previous section. With a few modifications to the already presented protocol we 
can achieve our goal of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. The protocol is as follows: 
1. Alice declares that she is sending secrets 1S  and 2S  in order (represented in appropriate 
polynomial form). 
Alice send to Bob: 11 Shrc AA +∗=    and   22 Shrc AA +∗= . 
2. Bob chooses 1c  if he wants to retrieve secret 1S  and 1c  if he wants to retrieve secret 2S . 
He then encrypts his choice using his secret key Bh  and a randomly chosen polynomial 
Br . 
Bob sends to Alice: 1Shrhrc AABB +∗+∗=   or   2Shrhrc AABB +∗+∗= . 
3. Alice decrypts the cipher sent by Bob by subtracting AA hr ∗  from c  and sends it back to 
Bob. 
Alice sends to Bob: 1Shrc BB +∗=′   or  2Shrc BB +∗=′  depending on what she 
receives. 
4. Bob can now subtract BB hr ∗  from c′  and deduce one of the secrets, depending on his 
choice. Alice remains oblivious to which of the two secrets Bob has received. 
At the end of the protocol, Bob will deduce only one of the two secrets and not be able to get 




In the chapter we have provided schemes for mutual exchange of secrets and 1-out-of-2 
oblivious transfer using NTRU. The protocol may be generalized to 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer 
and non-interactive oblivious transfer may be possible to implement.  
In this next chapter we will discuss the broader idea of basing the protocol for oblivious 
transfer on key-exchange protocols. This is an important idea since almost every public-key 





Oblivious Transfer Based on Key Exchange* 
In this chapter we construct a protocol for oblivious transfer using key exchange similar to 
the Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol [5], which is a popular method for establishing a shared key 
between two parties over an insecure channel. We modify the Diffie-Hellman protocol such that 
the two communicating parties will succeed or fail in establishing a shared key each with a 
probability of one-half. However, the party sending the secret will not know if the receiver has 
the same key as he/she does. 
The disadvantage of the protocol described by Rabin in [28] is that it is valid only when the 
encryption key is factorization dependent. In other words, Rabin’s protocol works only for 
“RSA- type” encryption schemes. However, the advantage of using the idea of oblivious transfer 
based on key exchange protocols is that after the keys are exchanged obliviously, the players can 
use any mutually agreed encryption scheme to encrypt their secrets. 
Further, with the advent of quantum computers, all the present protocols will be needed to 
be developed using quantum cryptography. Quantum key exchange has been proven to be secure 
and therefore an oblivious transfer scheme may be possible to develop using ideas similar to 
those presented in this chapter. 
There have been implementations [23] of 1-out-of-n OT based on the Decision Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) problem [2]. However, our protocol differs from previous ones in the sense that 
- firstly, we describe a scheme for mutual exchange of secrets based on DH. Secondly, in the 
previous implementations the 1-out-of-n OT use the DDH for the transfer itself, i.e. applies the 
Diffie-Hellman exponentiation for the encryption of secrets directly. Here we administer the idea 
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*Journal version to appear in Cryptologia. 
of the oblivious key exchange. Once the keys are exchanged (obliviously), the parties may use 
any mutually agreed encryption method for the actual transfer / exchange of secrets. 
5.1 Preliminary 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange was the first published public-key algorithm and a number of 
commercial products still employ this exchange technique [32]. The purpose of the algorithm is 
to enable two users to exchange a key securely that can be used for subsequent encryption of 
messages. The algorithm itself is limited to the exchange of the keys. As in the case of Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography, the Diffie-Hellman algorithm also depends for its effectiveness on the 
difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. Briefly, we can define the discrete logarithm in the 
following way.  
A number x  is said to be a primitive root of a prime number p  if consecutive 
exponentiations from , ,…,  generate distinct numbers lying 
between 1 and  in some order. Given  where 
px mod px mod2
b
px p mod1−
pi mod1−p x≡ x  is a primitive root of  then 
the task of finding a unique exponent i  where 0
p
)1( −≤≤ pi  satisfying the equation is known as 
taking the discrete logarithm of  for the base b x , .  pmod
With this background we proceed with the description of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
algorithm. The publicly known numbers are: a prime number p  and an integer x  that is a 
primitive root of p .  
1. Alice selects a random and secret integer pX A <  and computes p . xY A
X
A mod=
2. Bob independently selects a random and secret integer pX B <  and computes 
p .  xY BXB mod=
3. The values of  Y  are available publically. 
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4. Alice and Bob can communicate by computing a shared key  and 
, respectively.  
( ) pYK AXB mod=
( ) pYK BXA mod=







































At the end of execution of the algorithm the two participants have exchanged a secret key. 
The opponent has x , p ,  and  available to him and in order to break the algorithm, he is 
forced to take a discrete logarithm to determine the key. 
AY BY
In practice, the participants choose numbers p  and x , such that p  is a large prime on the 
order of at least 300 decimal digits (1024 bits), 1−p  has a large prime factor and x  is a 
generator of order  in the multiplicative group 1−p pΖ  (a generator is a primitive root of ). 
This ensures the security of the protocols not only against eavesdroppers but also against the 
opposing party, which is to be considered as an adversary as well in our protocol. Since we will 
be working only in , we often do not state it explicitly. 
p
pΖ
5.2 Mutual Exchange of Secrets – The Proposed Protocol 
Suppose Alice and Bob possess secrets  and  respectively, which they wish to 
exchange, however, they do not trust each other. We would like to complete the exchange 




latter being practically impossible to implement when the parties are geographically far apart. 
Both parties are assumed to have an appropriate mechanism to digitally sign every message they 
send. 
Let the secrets  and  be passwords to files that Bob and Alice want to access such that 
if a wrong password is used then the files will self-destruct. This prevents the parties from trying 
random passwords. The protocol is based on the oblivious exchange of encryption keys. 
AS BS
In the protocol, we exploit the fact that there exist pgg Ζ∈21, , 21 gg ≠  such that they map 
to a single cipher c , where . Let  denote the key that Alice uses to 
encrypt her secret, while Bob uses  to encrypt his secret. With these assumptions, the 






1. Alice and Bob agree upon a prime p , a number px Ζ∈  as the generator and c  such that 





2. Alice privately chooses 1gg A =  or 2gg A =  and two random numbers 1AN  and 2AN . 
3. Bob secretly decides on Bg , such that 1gg B =  or 2ggB =  and a random number BN . 
4. Alice sends to Bob: p  and p . x AA Ng mod1+ x AN mod2



















 and computes ( ) pxK BA NNA mod2=′  for himself. 



































7. Bob chooses a random message M  and sends ( )AKMfC ′= ,  to Alice. 
8. Alice sends back ( )AKC  to Bob.  fY ,1−=
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Here ),( kmf  is a function known to both Alice and Bob, where m  is the input, k  is the 
key, and knowing ),( kmf  does not reveal the key used. Therefore, f  may be an encryption 
function using a secret key and 1−f  is the decryption function. 
c =
Two cases arise from the above sequence, namely BA gg =  and . If BA gg ≠ BA gg =  then 
, else . Hence, Bob receives  with probability one-half. Steps 7 and 8 help 
Bob check if he has  by comparing  and 
AA KK =′ AA KK ≠′
AK
AK
Y M . 
























1. Prime  such that p 1−p  has a large prime factor. 
2. a number  that is a primitive root of . px Ζ∈ p
 
Figure 5.1 Illustration of proposed algorithm to achieve oblivious exchange of encryption key 




In order to prevent cheating by either party, Alice sends Aa SU ⊕  to Bob and Bob sends 
 to Alice. Since, neither party knows other’s state of knowledge of the secret key, this 
step does not provide either party with any knowledge of other’s secret.  
Bb SU ⊕
Finally, Alice and Bob exchange their secrets encrypting them using  and , 
respectively. 
AK BK
If at the last step, after Alice sends her encrypted secret to Bob, Bob was to cheat and not 
send his secret to Alice, then the fact that Bob cheated implies that Bob received  and 
 and that Bob had previously sent 
AK




The probability, after the protocol is complete, that neither party knows other’s secret key is 
one-fourth. 
Example 5.1: Alice and Bob wish to exchange secrets  and . They agree upon AS BS 23=p , 
 and . Therefore, 5=x 9=c 3mod 1 == gpc  and 20mod p 2 =g=c . We examine the two 
cases arising in step 2 of the algorithm. 
Case I:   BA gg =
2. Alice chooses: 31 == g  and two random numbers 51gA =AN  and 152 =AN . 
3. Bob chooses: 31 == g  and 17gB =BN . 
4. Alice sends to Bob: 1623  and  mod5mod 531 ≡≡ ++ px AA Ng



















































 and computes for himself: ( ) 2123mod19mod 172 ≡≡≡′ pxK BA NNA . 




































Bob may encrypt a random message with the key that he has generated and ask Alice to 
decrypt it using her key to determine if he has . Since Alice and Bob have chosen 
, then 
AK
3== BA gg 21==′ AA KK . The choice 20== BA gg  gives similar results. 
Case II:   BA gg ≠
2. Alice chooses: 31 == g  and two random numbers 51gA =AN  and 152 =AN . 
3. Bob chooses: 202 =  and 17= ggB =BN . 
4. Alice sends to Bob: 1623  and  mod5mod 531 ≡≡ ++ px AA Ng
                                            . 1923mod5mod 152 ≡≡px AN

















































 and computes for himself: ( ) 2123mod19mod 172 ≡≡≡′ pxK BA NNA . 




































In this case, Alice and Bob have chosen BA gg ≠ , hence AA KK ≠′ . The alternate choice, 
 and  yields similar results. 20=Ag 3=Bg
In none of the cases can Bob predict beforehand what choice Alice has made, so the protocol 
remains fair.  
Security issues: The protocol breaks down if Bob is able to compute both  
and 
( ) px BA NN mod2















≡ . Given , deducing  is a DLP. If we assume that “somehow” 










, he still needs to know 
either  or , which is again equivalent to a DLP. Based on the assumption that a Discrete 





5.3 One-out-of-two Oblivious Transfer 
 
One of the most powerful primitives that have led to the invention of numerous 
cryptographic schemes is the one-out-of-two oblivious transfer. It may conceptually be described 
as a black box where Alice puts in two secrets,  and , such that Bob can only retrieve one of 
them while getting no information about the other. Bob is concerned that Alice should not know 




A situation may be such that a spy wishes to sell one out of two secrets that he possesses, 
while the buyer does not wish the spy to know which information he wants. In such a situation 
the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer can be employed. It is assumed that the party possessing the two 
secrets is willing to disclose one and only one of these to the other. 
The procedure of choosing prime , generator number p x  and  
remains identical to that described before. However, this time Alice uses secret keys  and  
to encrypt secrets  and , respectively. She announces to Bob that she is associating key  









1. Alice secretly chooses 
1A
N  and sends to Bob: p . x ANg mod11 +
2. Bob chooses 1gg B = (if he wants secret 1S ) or 2ggB =  (if he wants secret 2S ) and 
secret numbers BN  and 1BN . 




















 and p . x BN mod
4. Alice chooses a number 
2A

















































































6. Alice computes: p  and xK AAB NNN mod211 ≡
( )( ) pxK AAB NNggN mod21212 +−≡ . 
7. Alice encrypts secret 1S  using 1K  and secret 2S  using 2K  and sends them to Bob. 
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From the above sequence we see that if Bob chooses 1gg B = , then  and if Bob 
chooses , then . Hence, Bob will only be able to retrieve one of the two secrets 
depending upon his choice, while Alice will not be able to determine which secret Bob has 
retrieved. 
1KKB =
2ggB = 2KKB =
Security issues: In order for Bob to cheat, he needs to compute both  and . His best 
option is to determine one of the keys honestly and using that, try to deduce the other key. For 











x . But this 
does not provide him with any information about  and  which he needs to compute . 
Similarly, he cannot calculate  from . The problem is again equivalent to efficiently 






5.4 Coin-Flipping Protocols 
 
A couple may decide on which restaurant to go to or whether they should take a vacation or 
buy a car for their next anniversary, by tossing a coin. In this case flipping a coin is a trivial 
matter since both parties are present at the same place physically. However, problems arise when 
the participants are geographically separated over large distances. How are they supposed to 
fairly flip a coin when both of them cannot see the outcome simultaneously? Many business 
transactions require such an arrangement or a simple game of gambling over the Web may need 
a fair coin-toss.  
It turns out that any oblivious transfer scheme may be suitably modified to flip a coin and so 
can be the protocol for mutual exchange of secrets that we have presented. For instance, if Bob 
receives the same key as Alice then Bob wins the toss else Alice wins. After Bob declares the 
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key he has computed, Alice replies if he won or lost and reveals all the variables that she had 
chosen which Bob can use to verify Alice’s claim. Bob need not disclose any of the variables of 
his choice. 
Another approach to coin-tossing by telephone is using d-sequences [17]. This becomes 
possible because the digits of the d-sequence are generated by an exponentiation process [18], 
[19]. But this will not be discussed further in this thesis. 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Our algorithms, in this chapter, open up the possibility of development of oblivious transfer 
schemes using key exchange protocols. Academically, it appears that such algorithms should 
have preceded Rabin’s protocol. The existence of our algorithm shows that there are numerous 
variations on the implementation of OT protocols. Also, most OT schemes can be extended to 
coin flipping with minor modifications, in which case, only one sided transfer may take place 
and victory or loss depends on the opposing party being lucky enough to deduce the key. 
Our protocol for mutual exchange of secrets is different from Rabin’s protocol in the sense 
that the latter aims at obliviously transmitting the decryption key from the transmitter to the 
receiver whereas we establish a shared key between the transmitter and receiver with probability 
one-half. Higher exponents may be employed to generate transfer probabilities other than one-
half. It turns out that the Diffie-Hellman protocol is a powerful primitive and can be used as a 
basis for implementing many cryptographic protocols that have been implemented via the RSA 





This thesis provides protocols to conduct mutual exchange of secrets using the idea of 
oblivious transfer and also provided schemes for one-out-of-two oblivious transfer. In Chapters 2 
and 3, the schemes provided are based on ECC and NTRU, respectively that are currently 
competing against RSA and have certain advantages over the latter. Before this thesis, oblivious 
transfer had been implemented only using exponential arithmetic and hence the wide spread use 
of the new cryptosystems depends on the fast development of schemes analogous to those that 
have been previously implemented using the outgoing cryptosystems. 
In the last chapter of the thesis, we have discussed an oblivious transfer scheme using the 
DH-key exchange for implementation. The scheme is not restricted to DH-key exchange and the 
basic idea is to emphasize the fact that oblivious transfer can be implemented using public-key 
exchange techniques.  
As a passing note we should also mention that with the advent of quantum computing and 
the discovery of fast factorization algorithm and discrete logarithm algorithm, if and when a 
quantum computer is realized, the systems of classical cryptography will collapse and may be the 
only form of cryptography that will be secure will be quantum cryptography [31]. However, 
quantum cryptography has had its own share problems with the discovery of no-go theorems. 
Yet quantum key exchange has been proven to be secure and our idea of basing the oblivious 
transfer on key exchange schemes might turn out to be a useful notion in quantum cryptography.  
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Also, we would like to mention that even though the factorization and discrete logarithm 
algorithms have already been discovered in quantum computing, there is not yet a quantum 
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